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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DETER.MINATION THAT HUDSON'S SIG-
NATURE 'VAS ON THE LOAN GUARANTY 
AGREE~IENT DOES NOT ESTABLISH 
THAT IT 'VAS A VALID ENFORCEABLE 
CONTRACT. 
In its opinion the majority of this Court said: 
"'Vhen the plaintiff proved the signature on 
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the Loan Guaranty Agreement to be that of 
Hudson, it made out a prima facie case, and the 
burden of going forward with evidence would fall 
upon the defendant Hudson. However, the ulti-
mate burden of showing an agreement is on the 
plaintiff." 
Both Respondent and The Utah Bankers Association 
agree with the foregoing statements. The Bankers Asso-
ciation, however, contends that the prima facie proof 
satisfies the "ultimate burden" unless Hudson estab-
lishes his defense of fraud ( Amicus Curiae Brief p. 5) , 
and the Respondent Bank argues that it discharged its 
ultimate burden by simply proving the signature of 
Hudson (Respondent's Pet. for Rehear. and Brief p. 
12) . Professor Corbin clearly points out that a writing, 
even bearing signatures, does not make a contract. 
"An unsigned agreement all the terms of 
which are embodied in a writing, unconditionally 
assented to by both parties, is a written contract. 
It is true that the fact that they have expressed 
unconditional assent must be proved by testimony 
of their unwritten expressions; it is not evidenced 
by the writing itself. But the same is true of a 
writing that has been signed by both parties. 
Writing does not make a contract, not even if the 
writing bears both signatures. The fact that a 
man has signed an apparently complete expression 
of the terms of a contract is indeed strong evi-
dence that he is thereby expressing his uncondi-
tional assent. In the absence of all other evidence 
to the contrary, it is almost enough; but if there 
is other evidence to the contrary, the signature it-
self is not conclusive .... There must be satis-
factory evidence that the signature was affixed 
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with intent to authenticate and express assent to 
the entire document .... 
"A document is a 'written contract' if it has 
been assented to by the necessary parties as ex-
pressing fully and accurately the terms upon 
which they have agreed. Such a document was 
described by Wigmore as an 'integration' of the 
agreement. The question whether they have so 
agreed is a question of fact, one that the docu-
ment itself cannot answer; extrinsic evidence of 
their assent to it as such is always necessary, even 
though the document bears the signatures of the 
parties. The existence of such a signed document 
may indeed be evidential of assent to it as an 'in-
tegration', its weight as such evidence depending 
upon the character and terms of the writing that 
it contains and upon its physical appearance; but 
it is never conclusive. . .. No inert instrument is 
proof of its own genuineness and its execution 
and delivery by the parties." 
Appellant Hudson testified at the trial that he 
never knowingly signed the guaranty agreement; that 
the first time he saw it, and the first time he knew that a 
loan had been made by the Respondent Bank to Osborne, 
was about IO months after the loan had been completed 
when representatives of the Respondent Bank made the 
trip to Moab to advise him that they were accelerating 
payment under Osborne's note; that he never received 
any of the money loaned to Osborne and was never con-
tacted by the Respondent Bank or by any one else with 
reference to the loan prior to time representatives of the 
bank made said trip to Moab. (R. 58, 59) Hudson also 
testified that on occasions he signed papers given to him 
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by Osborne in the bank and that the only way his signa-
ture could have been obtained was by some trick or ruse. 
The statement quoted in the Court's opinion from 
38 Am. J ur. 2d, Guaranty, Section 55, at page 1058, to 
the effect that a guaranty agreement must conform to 
formal requirements pertaining to contracts, is supple-
mented by other observations in the same text, such as 
the following: 
"The enforceability of the [guaranty] promise 
is determined by the law of contracts; that is, the 
creditor can recover from the promisor only if the 
promise of guaranty has become a 'contract' 
promise. Thus, the doctrines of mutual assent, 
consideration, and conditions are applicable to 
the formation of enforceable guaranties." ( 38 
Am. Jur. 2d Sec. 1, Guaranty) 
"To obligate a person ... as a guarantor on a 
contract of guaranty it must be shown that the 
alleged guarantor was, in fact, a promisor in the 
contract." ( 38 Am.J ur. ,2d Sec. 27, Guaranty) 
"In order to establish a cause of action against 
the defendant guarantor, the obligee or creditor 
must show that the debtor is liable on the princi-
pal obligation. The creditor must also establish 
the validity of the guaranty contract." ( 38 Am. 
J ur. 2d Sec. 122, Guaranty) 
POINT II 
HUDSON'S TESTIMONY THAT HIS SIGNA-
TURE WAS OBTAINED BY TRICK OR RUSE 
IS SUPPORTED BY OTHER EVIDENCE RE-
CEIVED AND BY EVIDENCE ERRONEOUS-
LY REJECTED BY TRIAL COURT. 
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Hudson's uncontroverted testimony was supported 
by evidence received, and by evidence offered but erro-
neously rejected. Cross examination of the vice presi-
dent of Respondent Bank who handled the loan applica-
tion (.Mr. James W. Mackley), established that the 
Bank did not contact Hudson until 10 months after the 
loan was granted when it was learned that Osborne was 
leaving the Moab Bank. According to .Mackley, he may 
have tried to telephone Hudson in Moab but if the call 
was tried it was not successful in reaching him. One 
relevant and significant aspect of the failure of the Re-
spondent Bank to get in touch with Hudson prior to 
making the loan lies in the importance to Osborne that 
Hudson should not learn of the loan application. It was 
vitally essential to the success of Osborne's plan and 
scheme that neither Hudson nor any officer or employee 
of the Moab Bank should learn of the loan application 
and the submission of a loan guaranty agreement bear-
ing Hudson's name. It is a fair inference from the fact 
that the Respondent Bank did not contact Hudson that 
Osborne was able to convince Mackley that it was not 
necessary to contact him. If the Bank had talked with 
Hudson by telephone or written him about the proposed 
loan, Osborne's fraud would have been disclosed and the 
loan would not have been made. Hudson would have 
made it very plain to the Respondent Bank that he would 
not guarantee any such loan. 
Proof of the manner in which Osborne obtained a 
financial statement from Hudson-which, incidentally, 
was addressed to the Moab Bank, not the Grand J unc-
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tion Respondent Bank-also supported Hudson's un-
controverted testimony that he knew nothing about the 
loan to Osborne. If Hudson had known of the proposed 
loan and had agreed to act as guarantor thereof, he would 
have addressed his financial statement to the Grand 
Junction Bank, not to the Moab Bank. 
There is ample evidence, received and erroneously 
rejected, to support Hudson's uncontroverted testi-
mony that the signature on the Loan Guaranty Agree-
ment was obtained by trick and deception. As this Comt 
pointed out in its opinion, "If Hudson can be believed, 
he was imposed upon by somebody, and the logical ex-
planation is that it was by Osborne who so desperately 
needed the money to cover his peculations, and who 
could not get the loan without the guaranty of Hudson." 
It might be added, Osborne knew he could not get Hud-
son, or anyone else, to guaranty his loan especially if the 
purpose of the loan should be discovered. The despera-
tion facing Osborne was equalled only by his cunning. 
He came up with a scheme that almost worked. One of 
the steps in the scheme was to get Hudson's signature 
on a loan guaranty agreement without his knowledge. 
The Grand Junction Bank fell in with another step in 
his plan, namely, to get the loan approved without Hud-
son's knowledge, or knowledge on the part of the officers 
of his bank, the Moab National Bank. 
Hudson was not known to Mackley, or any other 
officer at the Grand Junction Bank. Hudson had never 
had dealings with that bank, yet Mackley chose to grant 
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the loan of $60,000.00 without first talking with Hudson 
by telephone or in person, and without any other kind of 
communication with him. lVIackley relied entirely upon 
Osborne for information about Hudson and relied en-
tirely upon Osborne's representations, implicit and ex-
plicit, as to the genuineness of the loan guaranty agree-
ment and Hudson's signature thereon. 
The evidence offered, but erroneously rejected by 
the trial court, as to how the money borrowed by Osborne 
was used, namely to try to conceal his embezzlements 
from the Moab National Bank, makes it clear why Os-
borne was careful to not let Hudson know anything 
about the loan or how the money was used. Obviously, if 
Osborne had told Hudson about the loan, Hudson would 
have advised the Grand Junction bank of his unwilling-
ness to guarantee the loan. And if Hudson had learned 
of the real reason why Osborne needed money so desper-
ately the loan would not only have been refused but Os-
borne's embezzlements would have been disclosed. Evi-
dence of the use for which the money received from the 
Grand Junction Bank was used made it very clear why 
Osborne deceived Hudson and the Grand Junction 
Bank. That evidence was very enlightening in that it 
turned the spotlight on Osborne's grand plan and scheme 
to get money to cover substantial embezzlements from 
the Moab Bank. As this Court pointed out this evidence 
was very material in "showing a motive on the part of 
Osborne to procure Hudson's signature by trick or 
fraud." 
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POINT III 
THERE IS NO NEED FOR CLARIFICATION 
OF THE COURT'S DECISION, AND THE PE-
TITION FOR REHEARING SHOULD BE DE-
NIED. 
In its brief Amicus Curiae the Utah Bankers Asso-
ciation state (at page 7): 
"It is imperative that the rules pertaining to the 
validity and enforceability of such guaranties be 
clear and fixed, and ones on which bankers in this 
state may rely. Any lack of clarity in this area-
and particularly when such lack of clarity stems 
from this state's highest court-will result iu 
banks not risking their loans when the enforce-
ability of guaranties securing the loans is so 
shrouded in doubt." 
There is no lack of clarity in the Court's Decision. 
The Court simply pointed out two things: 
I. The validity and enforceability of loan guar-
anty agreements will be determined in the same 
manner that the validity and enforceability of 
other contracts are determined. 
2. This "is a case in contract and the plaintiff 
has the burden of showing that Hudson agreed to 
be a guarantor for the Osborne note," and "the 
ultimate burden of showing an agreement is 011 
the plaintiff." 
It is surprising to find that Respondent Bank and 
the Bankers Association find any ambiguity in those 
statements. Respondent Bank asks this question in its 
brief (page 6 ) : 
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"Does this mean that Bank has the ultimate bur-
den of proving the absence of fraud?" 
,,Vhat the Court said was that Respondent Bank had the 
burden of proving that Hudson "agreed to be a guaran-
tor for the Osborne note." If Respondent Bank cannot 
prove such a promise by Hudson, then it cannot prove a 
valid and enforceable contract. This is a matter that 
should have been the first concern of Respondent Bank 
when Osborne applied for the loan and submitted to the 
llank a paper purporting to be a valid promise by Hud-
son to guarantee Osborne's note. 
The Utah Bankers Association in its Brief, Amicus 
Curiae, also states: 
"It is essential for the future of sound banking 
practice in this state that banks be in a position to 
secure valid and enforceable guaranties with re-
spect to commercial and personal loans. The un-
availability of such guaranties will simply mean 
that such loans may not be made." 
To that statement we respectfully express the view that 
the Grand Junction Bank should have determined the 
validity and enforceability of the loan guaranty agree-
ment prior to the granting of the loan rather than post-
pone that inquiry until after there has been a default and 
action brought against the alleged guarantor. In this 
case a simple inquiry by the Respondent Bank of Hud-
son would have disclosed Osborne's fraudulent actions 
and prevented the granting of the loan. 
If a lending bank would protect itself-prepare it-
self to successfully bear the ultimate burden of showing 
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the validity of a contract to which it is a party-it would 
make inquiry as to the genuineness. and enforceability 
of a purported guaranty agreement prior to the granting 
of the applied for loan. The law does not extend to a 
lending bank the privilege of being so unconcerned with 
the validity of such an agreement that it totally refrains 
from contacting the other party to the agreement who is 
completely unknown to the bank. A lending bank is not 
legally excused from liability if it relies solely upon rep-
resentations as to genuineness made by the debtor, who 
is not a party to the guaranty agreement. 
In the situation involved in this case it would have 
taken only a minimal effort on the part of Respondent 
Bank to contact Hudson, the other party to the agree-
ment. A completed telephone call, a letter or any other 
form of communication to Hudson informing him of 
Osborne's application for a $60,000.00 loan and of the 
loan guaranty agreement purporting to bear his signa-
ture, would have brought to light Osborne's fraudulent 
conduct, and the loan would not have been made. This, 
indeed is an unusual situation. One party to a guaranty 
agreement, to whom the other party is a complete 
stranger, doesn't even consider it advisable, let alone 
necessary, to go to the trouble of getting in touch with 
the other party before granting a loan application for 
$60,000.00. The plea of Respondent Bank to be protect-
ed from its own folly, and to allow it to recover from an 
innocent person who knew nothing about the loan and 
never formed any intention of acting as guarantor of 
this, or any other loan, is a plea for a degree of paternal-
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ism unmatched in any other segment of society or in any 
other area of our economy. In effect Respondent Bank 
takes the position that even though Hudson did not 
promise to guarantee Osborne's loan the Bank should be 
permitted to recover the $60,000.00 from him, plus ap-
proximately $30,000.00 in costs and attorney's fees-
and that regardless of whether the loan guaranty agree-
ment was a valid contract or a totally invalid contract 
the Bank should recover. If the position taken by the 
Respondent Bank were sustained great harm would 
be done. Banks would be encouraged to refrain from 
inquiring as to the validity of contracts they enter into 
and permitted to recover from innocent parties. The 
Court should reaffirm its holding that the validity and 
enforceability of loan guaranty agreements will con-
tinue to be determined as the validity and enforceability 
of other contracts are determined. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petition for Rehearing should be denied. 
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